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Achieving cooperation in world politics is generally viewed to be difficult. This is because
of the structural and circumstantial dispositions of the actors in international relations. And
yet, cooperation is at times attained. Theories of international relations offer various
inductive and deductive methods of analysis in examining cooperation.　Although this
research is not designed to portray all of such approaches, this paper is designed to explore
this subject in the following manner. First, the definition of cooperation will be briefly
addressed, because as a term, cooperation is both ambiguous and aloof - there is the necessity
to designate what this study will define cooperation as. Second, the paper will provide a
descriptive analysis of how cooperation as a theme is dealt with in the theories of
international relations. This will be done by assessing how cooperation is portrayed by
different theories of. thought in international relations. In doing this, the study hopes to
examine how the attainability of cooperation is inscribed by different theoretical genres.
Third, game theory will be assimilated as the fundamental guideline of this research. In this
assimilation, this examination will designate the effectiveness of strategies of reciprocity and
how it can be used m the dilemma this research is attempting to resolve.
1. Cooperation and Game Theory in International Relations
In order to study about cooperation in international relations, the matter of foremost
importance is designating what cooperation means. Although conflict is commonly viewed as
the antithesis of cooperation, unfortunately, this does not provide much in the way of
understanding'. Commonly, cooperation can only take place in situations that contain a
mixture of both conflicting and complementary interest.　Furthermore, cooperation can be
realized through several different means in international politics.　Generally, we can
categorize the types into: tacit, explicit, and imposed cooperation. Explicit cooperation
indicates cooperation entailing a bargaining or negotiating process, examples being the
negotiation of treaties and bargaining disarmament. According to Milner, this is the most
1) Harmony simply entails the absence of gains from defection. Generally, the question of cooperation can be
referred to only when situations contain a mixture of both conflicting and complementary interests. See
Kenneth A. Oye, HExplaining Cooperation Under Anarchy: Hypothesis and Strategies," in Kenneth A. Oye ed.,
Cooperation Under Anarchy (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1986), pp. 1-24.
2 ) According to Milner, cooperation can also be imposed by the stronger actor in a relationship that forces the
weaker actor to compromはe its policies. See Helen Muner, International Theories of Cooperation Among
Nations: Strength and Weaknesses, World Poutb, Vol. 44, No. 3 (April, 1992), pp. 466-496.
Cooperation and Game Theory in International Relations111
common form of cooperation in international relations.3' On the other hand, in tacit
cooperation, the involved parties'cooperative behavior occurs as a result of convergence of the
actors expectations. The most notable example can be the prisoner's dilemma, where policy
coordination is a result of calculated benefit from the payoff matrix. In an imposed
cooperation, one party forcefully alters the behavior of opposite party. Imposed cooperation
is often a result of hegemonic leadership in international negotiations.
When we break down cooperation into these categories, this research is concerned primarily
about tacit cooperation. Accordingly, the following definition of cooperation offered by
Robert 0. Keohane best grasps the relationship between the involved parties for the purposes
of this research - cooperation occurs "when actors adjust their behavior to the actual or
anticipated preferences of others, through a process of policy coordination."4' From this
definition, three inherent features of cooperation can be extracted; (1) that actors- adjustment
is directed toward some goal; (2) that vested effort is embedded in the process; and (3) that
some type of benefit is presupposed by the bestowed effort. By using this definition, this
research recognizes that achieving cooperation and sustaining a stable cooperative
relationship, is a painstaking process, involving sacrifice from all involved parties. A notable
magnitude of work has already been done in international relations theory in order to
conceive the manner of this "effort,1-　and to understand the possibilities of attaining
cooperation.
As with other issues of international politics, realism has dominated the study of
cooperation since World War II. 6' For realists, international anarchy fosters competition and
conflict among states, inhibiting their willingness to cooperate even when they share commonI
3) Ibid., p. 469.
4 ) Robert 0. Keohane, After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy (New Jersey:
Princeton University Press, 1984), p. 51.
5 ) Among them, the major challenge to realism was the more optimistic view presented by liberal institutionalism,
mainly in the form of functionalist integration theory in the 1940s and the early 1950s, and the neo-functionalist
in regional integration theory in the 1950s and the 1960s, and interdependence theory in the 1970s. For
functional and neofuctionalism see, David Mitrany, A Working Peace System (Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1966)-
David Mitrany, The Functional Theory of Politics (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1976); James Patrick Sewell,
Punctionalism and World Politics: A Study on United Nations Programs Financing Economic Development (Nev
Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1966); and Ernst B. Haas, Beyond Nation-State: Functionalism and
lnternational Organization (Stan ford: Stan ford University Press, 1964).
6) For realist works, see, E. H. Carr, The Twenty Years Crisis, 1919-1939: An Introduction to the Study of
lnternational Relations (London and New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1964); Hans J. Morganthau, Politics Among
Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace, 5th ed. (New York: Knopf, 1973); Kenneth N. Waltz, Man the State
and war: A Theoretical Amαlysis (New York: Columbia University Press, 1959); John J. Mearsheimer, The
Tragedy of Great Power Politics (New York and London: W. W. Norton & Company, 2001); James N. Rosenau,
Turbulence in World Politics: A theory of Change and Continuity (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1990);
Michael W. Doyle and G. John Ikenberry eds. New Thinking in International Relations Theory (Boulder:
Westview Press, 1997); Robert 0. Keohane ed. Neorealism and Its Critics (New York; Columbia University Press,
1986); and Scott Burchill, Richard Devetak, Andrew Linklater, Mathew Paterson, Christian Reus-Smit and Jacqui
True, Theories of International Relations, 2nd ed. (New York: Palgrave, 1995).
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interests.　Furthermore, even in the presence of international institutions, realists argue
that inter-state cooperation is problematic. Realism is based on the presumption that states
in anarchy strive for survival as independent actors and this survival implies that
achievements of joint gains that serve as an advantage for one state in the present might
produce a more dangerous potential foe in the future.　Thus realist interpretations on
cooperation deal with the problem of absolute and relative gam. Such perception can be best
illustrated through Rousseau's stag hunt. Men in a stag hunt can cooperate to trap the stag
and all are able to eat well. However, unlike the men in stag hunt, nations in international
politics are faced with various obstacles that inhibit cooperation, mainly stemming from the
anarchic world order. Evidently, realism presents a very pessimistic view on the prospect of
international cooperation. 9
In addition to this, states worry about a division of possible gams that may be more
beneficial to others than to themselves. According to Kenneth N. Waltz, this is the first
way in which the structure of international politics limits the cooperation of states.'り0)
Furthermore, states also worry that they can become too dependent on others through
cooperative endeavors, such as the exchanges of goods and services. This, according to
Waltz, is the second way in which the structure of international politics limits the
cooperation of states.1　The realists'understanding of cooperation among states is closely
linked to their emphasis on the structure of international system. A certain structure
encourages certain behavior, and an anarchic structure usually works against achieving
cooperation.
Inherently, although not all scholars with realist leanings will concur, realism's view is
constrained by its predispositions. These predispositions are mainly: 1) states are the major
actors in world affairs; 2) the international environment severely penalizes states if they fail
to protect their- vital interests or if they pursue objectives beyond their means; 3)
7) Joseph M. Grieco, "Anarchy and the Limits of Cooperation: A Realist Critique of the Newest Liberal
Institutionalism," International Organizaわon Vol. 42, No.3 (Summer, 1988), p, 485.
8) The term anarchy is one of the most prominent key themes in international politics. However, there is no
common definition all adhere to. Conventionally, the term indicates the lack of an international government in
world politics, or simply, the lack of central authority. Robert Axelrod and Robert O. Keohane note that
military-security issues display more of the characteristics associated with anarchy compared to political-
economic issues. See Robert Axelrod and Robert 0. Keohane, Achieving Cooperation under Anarchy: Strategies
and Institutions," in Kenneth Oye eds., Cooperation U:柁der Anarchy, pp. 226-254.
9 ) For this view, see, Robert G. Gilpin, "The Richness of the Tradition of Political Realism, in Robert Keohane, ed.,
Neorealism and Lは　Critics, p. 304　and Hans J. Morganthau, Scientific Man us. Po乙〃er Politics (Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 1946), pp. 187-203.
10) Kenneth N. Waltz, "Anarchic Orders and Balances of Power, in Robert 0. Keohane ed., Neorealism and Its
Critics, pp. 102-103.
ll) Ibid.
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international anarchy is the principle force shaping the motives and actions of states; 4)
states in anarchy are preoccupied with power and security and are predisposed toward
conflict and competition, often failing to cooperate even in the face of common interests; and
5) international institutions affect the prospect for cooperation only marginally.
The major challenge to realists- views on cooperation was the emergence of liberalism and
especially, liberal institutionalism.　First, they objected to realism's proposition on the
centrality of states as dominant actors in international affairs. Functionalists suggested that
the key new actors in world politics were specialized international agencies and their technical
experts; for neofunctionalists, they were labor unions, political parties, trade associations,
and supranational bureaucracies; and for the interdependence liberals, they were
multinational corporations and transnational.I3) secondly, liberal institutionalists countered
the realist view that states are unitary or rational agents. Functionalists argued that
authority was becoming decentralized within modern states and that a similar process was
underway internationally.14' Third, liberals argued that states were becoming- less concerned
about power and security. Fourthly, they accordingly also rejected realism's fourth
proposition that states are fundamentally unwilling to cooperate. Liberals also rejected
realism s pessimism about international institutions.
This new wave of challenges started in the 1940s and the early 1950s with functionalist
integration theory. To functionalists, the key new actors in world politics were to be
specialized international agencies and their technical experts. This was explained due to the
decentralization within modern states and the similar process that was taking place
internationally. The neofunctionalists advanced the debate by allocating that these
specialized agencies were labor unions, political parties, trade associations, and supranational
bureaucracies. The contribution of interdependence theory was that international politics was
increasingly characterized by '一multiple channels of access", advanced by transnational and
trans一governmental coalitions of multinational corporations.15'
The neoliberalist claims about cooperation are based on the belief that states are atomistic
actors. Unlike realists, they posit that states seek to maximize their individual absolute
gams and are indifferent to the relative gains achieved by others. Cheating is seen as the-'''''''''''''''''''''''''''''T
12) Grieco argues that neoliberalism has wrongly interpreted the realist analysis of international anarchy and
therefore it misunderstands the realist analysis of the impact of anarchy on the preferences and actions of
states. See Grieco, "Anarchy and the Limits of Cooperation," p. 487.
13) See David Mitrany, Working Peace System, pp.7, 85-87, 133-134; Ernst Haas, Beyond the Nation-State, pp. 32-40-
and Robert O. Keohane and Joseph Nye, eds., Transnational Relations and World Politics (Cambridge: Harvard
University Press, 1972), pp. ix-xxix, 371-98.
14) Ibid., pp. 54-55, 63, 69-73, 134-38.
15) Grieco, "Anarchy and the Limits of Cooperation," p. 487.
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greatest hindrance to cooperation among egoistic states, but international institutions can
help states overcome this obstacle. In contrast to such liberal understandings, realism
asserts that states are positional in character, and therefore m addition to the apprehensions
about cheating, states also worry about relative gains.　In this sense, for realism,
international cooperation is difficult based on two fundamental barriers, the problem of
cheating and concerns over relative gams.
Notable advances in neoliberal claims with regards to cooperation were made by Robert
Axelrod. In essence, neoliberals do not deny the anarchic nature of the international system,
but argue that there is a need to emphasize一㌔he varieties of cooperative behavior within… a
decentralized system.'　Recognizing that "there is no common government to enforce rules,
and by the standards of domestic society, international institutions are weak,I Axelrod
developed an approach to cooperation that could bypass the theoretical reluctance on the
attainability of cooperation.1ョ　States in anarchy are often entangled in situations of mixed-
interests　-　a condition often referred to as non-zero-sum, and can be described by the
prisoner's dilemma."
Neoliberal thinkers often employ game theory to explain why states do or do not
cooperate, and their approach tends to emphasize the possibility of mutual wins, where
similar interests can be arranged and compromised for joint benefit. Althou盆h states may
be liable to defect without a central authority monitoring the accommodations, Axelrod noted
that countervailing forces often do exist - forces that cause states to keep their promises and
thus to resolve the prisoner's dilemma. Lipson notes that Axelrod's ideas are important
because they, "obviously bear on a central issue in international relations theory; the
emergence and maintenance of cooperation among sovereign, self-interested states, operating
without any centralized authority."2
-Fundamentally, game theory is a mathematical method of studying decision-making in
situations of conflict, where game theorists study the predicted and actual behavior of
individuals in games, as well as optimal strategies. Game theory describes the concept of
16) For arguments on absolute and relative gains, see Joseph Grieco, Robert Powell and Duncan Snidal, The
Relative-Gains Problem for International Cooperation," The American Political Science Review, Vol. 87, No. 3
(September, 1993), pp. 729-743.
17) Graham Evan and Jeffery Newnham, The Penguin Dictionary of International Relations, (London: Penguin
Books, 1998), p. 189.
18) Axelrod and Keohane, "Achieving Cooperation,' p. 226.
19) In 1950, Merrill Flood and Melvin Dresher devised a baffling'riddle, which Albert W. Tucker later dubbed as the
prisoner's dilemma. According to William Poundstone, the prisoner's dilemma is a precise mathematical
construct and also a real-life problem. See William Poundstone, Prisoners Dilemma (New York: Random House,
1992.
20) Lipson, "International Cooperation," p. 6.
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cooperation as a ''game'between players and classifies them into categories that determine
which particular method one can apply to solving them. A common classification divides
these games into zero-sum and non-zero-sum games. In zero-sum games the total benefit to
all players in▼the game, for every combination of strategies, always adds to zero - a player
benefits only at the expense of others. The game of chess or poker game is often employed
as metaphor implying that one wins exactly the amount of one's opponent losses.
By contrast, non-zero-sum games work under the assumption that pure conflict is dropped
from the game and the players face outcomes where they can both lose or both win, where
coordination and cooperation emerge as alternatives to pure conflict. In principal, most real
world situations in both economic and political fields are of a non-zero-sum nature　-
technically a gain by one player does not necessarily correspond with a loss by another.
Analyzing zero-sum games is always easier because one can transform any game into a zero-
sum game by adding an additional '-dummy" player whose losses compensate the player-s net
winnings. Recalling our working definition of cooperation, this study is concerned about
cooperation in non-zero-sum games. Mainly, game theory provides a model for interpreting,
deductively, the logic of choices made by players in relation to other players in a game. A
variety of games have been analyzed for this purpose. Such games include: stag hunt,
chicken, harmony, deadlock, pure coordination, and most prominently, the prisoner's
dilemma.2
Although game theory has often been employed as one of the theoretical tools for
international relations, it has been criticized on the grounds that the theory generally
demands more information than it provides answers.22' For example: Who are the relevant
actors? What are the rules of the game? What are the payoff structures? Is the game a
one-shot or a repeated game? Furthermore, although many questions are demanded in
applying the theory, game theory cannot always incorporate all of the available information.
These include: the historical framework of the game environment, and the actual dynamics of
the foreign policy making process. Similarly, there have been numerous questions as to
whether game theory can be relevantly applied to complex phenomena such as international
relations without incorporating psychological and cognitive elements so neglected in the
theory.23　As Deborah Larson points out, simple game models omit many of the processes
that are言n fact, critical factors in international relations, such as the images held of the
~
21) For detailed descriptions of- different games, refer to Oye, Cooperation Under Anarchy, pp. 7-9.
22) Snidal∴'The Game Theory of International Relations," p. 26.
23) Robert Jervis, "Realism, Game Theory, and Cooperation," World Politics Vol.30, pp. 319-20.
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opponent, double standards and the significance of attaining reciprocity.2'
In addition, game theory is often criticized for assumptions made on the rationality of
decision makers. According to Joshua Goldstein and John Freeman, "rationality implies
some objective criterion of self-interest which guides actors choices. But there may be no
objective criterion that defines the interests of a nation, in which various sub-units pull and
tug toward conflicting goals."　Furthermore, some critics argue that many of the conflicts
in international politics modeled after the prisoner's dilemma often fit a coordination game
rather than a prisoner's dilemma, with significant repercussions for the possibility of
enhancing cooperation on some key international issues.　And therefore, a "true prisoner's
dilemma is probably not a common situation in international politics."2
Unfortunately, as a theory, game theory indeed is hampered by shortcomings when applied
to pragmatic cases in international relations. However, in general, game theory has been
widely applied to international politics as metaphor, analogy, or model rather than as a
theory. Among the different usages, "most applications of game theory to international
politics have been in terms of metaphor and analogy."　Game metaphors and analogies
often employ major game-theoretic themes, such as the payoff structure, shadow of the
future, and strategies to discuss the issues of international politics.  In game-theoretic
24) Deborah W. Larson, "The Psychology of Reciprocity in International Relations, p. 281-301. Larson recognizes
that Axelrod's approach involves a kind of "learning" but relies on assumptions about the learning process that
are contradicted by her psychological research. Others also hold similar views to Larson, see Joanne Gowa,
"Anarchy, Egoism and Third Images: The Evolution of Cooperation and International Relations, International
Organization Vol. 40, pp. 167-86; and Robert Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics.
25) Joshua S. Goldstein and John R. Freeman, Three-Way Street: Strategic Reciprocity m World Politics, (Chicago:
University of Chicago Press), 1990, p. 12; See also T, Moe, On the Scientific Status of Rational Choice Models,
American Journal of Political Science, Vol. 23, pp. 215-43; and Christopher Achen and Duncan Snidal, Rational
Deterrence Theory and Comparative Case Studies, World Poutks, Vol. 41, pp. 143-69.
26) According to Snidal, cooperation in the coordination game depends on the surrounding social-political contexts,
such as "established traditions or shared principles that are likely to provide the basis for the emergence of
norms or conventions which will guide individual national behavior in an issue area. See Snidal, Coordination
vs. Prisoner's Dilemma: Implications for International Cooperation and Regimes, American Political Science
Review, Vol. 79, pp. 923-42, especially p. 937　for difference between a game of prisoners dilemma and
coordination game.
27) Bruce Russett, The Prisoners of Insecurity: Nuclear Deterrence, the Arms Race, and Arms Control, (San
Francisco: W. H. Freeman), 1983, p. 115. Others argue that nations often prefer mutual defection over mutual
cooperation, displaying the characteristics of a game of Deadlock rather than prisoners dilemma, see Harrison
R. Wagner, "The Theory of Games and the Problem of International Cooperation," American Political Science
Review, Vol. 77, pp. 330-46; and W. Downs, David Rocke, and Randolph Siverson, Arms Races and Cooperation,
World Politics, Vol. 38, pp. 118-46, reprinted in Kenneth A. Oye, ed., Cooperation Under Anarchy Prmceton:
Princeton University Press), 1986.
Snidal provides examples of metaphors such as "falling dominoes, and the Cuban missile crisis as a game of
Chicken," and notes that analogies and models are to some extent simply more controlled metaphors. See Smdal,
'The Game Theory of International Politics," pp.29-36.
29) For authors such as Duncan Snidal, the concepts of strategy, strategic rationality, preferences, and payoffs are
incorporated. See Axelrod and Keohane, "Cooperation Under Anarchy," p. 228; and Oye, Cooperation Under
Anarchy: Hypothesis and Strategies," pp. 5-20; and Smdal, The Game Theory of International Politics, pp. 36-
37.
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approaches, game themes are then deployed to study security dilemmas, through comparison
with the prisoner's dilemma. The prisoner's dilemma has been applied to issues of arms race
and control, crisis management, military alliances, monetary cooperation, tax policy
coordination, and trade liberation.
2. Shadow of the Future
No matter what type of game the players are playing, in a single-play game, there is
always the temptation to seek immediate gains from unilateral defection. However, in
repeated games, the effect is different. Then how does continuing the game affect the
likelihood of cooperation? Iteration is known to increase the likelihood of cooperation in
prisoner's dilemma and stag hunt, but diminishes the prospect for cooperation in chicken. The
shadow of the future is closely related to iteration, because simply, iteration implies a
shadow of the future. The shadow of the future can only be lengthened when there is a
strong prospect for continued interaction.
Generally, the future is less important than the present, in other words, the payoff of the
next move always counts less than the payoff of the current move. This, according to
Martin Shubik, is due to two primary reasons. First, players tend to value payoffs less as
the time of their obtainment recedes into the future. Second, there is always some chance
that the players will never meet again.30' When players value future payoffs relative to the
present, the likelihood that they will defect today lessens. Due to this logic, there is the need
to enlarge the shadow of the future in order to promote cooperation.
If the future is important relative to the present, there are two major merits for the
stability of that cooperation. First of all, "the players can each use an implicit threat of
retaliation against the other's defection - if the interaction will last long enough to make the
threat effective."31 This is because, first of all, the interaction may not continue in the
future. Secondly, the future is typically less important compared to the present because
players usually prefer to get a gain today, rather than wait. Strategies based on reciprocity
can only be effective if the iteration will last long enough to make the threat effective∴'with.11111111111111111111IT
30) Shubik, 1970, The weight of the next move relative to the current move will be called w, presenting the degree
to which the payoff of each move is discounted relative to the previous move. This discounted payoff is called
a discount parameter by Shubik and this terminology is often employed by economic theorists. For example, if
each move is only half as important as the previous move, the discount parameter is presented as w-l/2. In the
field of international relations, shadow of the future is the preferred terminology. See Martin Shubik, Strategy
and Market Structure, (New York: Wiley, 1990) and Martin Shubik, "Game Theory, Behavior, and the Paradox
of Prisoners Dilemma: Three Soloctiona," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 13, pp. 181-94.
31) Axelrod, The Evolution of Cooperation, p. 126.
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a large shadow cooperation based on reciprocity is stable.''　According to Axelrod, there are
two ways to enlarge the shadow: by making the interactions more durable, and by making
them more frequent.
For a pragmatic example, we can refer to the strategic setting of Europe prior to the
World War I where the shadow of the future was shortened in two distinctive ways.　First,
there were many advocating the perception that a decisive war was inevitable, suggesting
that the iteration will not continue for too long. This meant thaてt incentives for European
states to engage in long-tern s with one another were significantly reduced. Second, due to
the lack of transparency surrounding the decision-making processes, transactions between
states were restricted to a few large ones. Iteration was le㍊ened and 'the shadow of the
future by magnifying the importance of each transaction relative to the next."　By making
small moves rather than a few large moves and thereby increasing the shadow of the future
can make reciprocity more effective.　Strategies of reciprocity can only improve the
contemplation of cooperation under the conditions of iteration.31
3. Payoff Structure
Game theory, taking rationality for granted, assumes that players (states) pursue certain
goals. A game analogy begins by analyzing players一motivations and examining how their
preferences map into the payoff structure. Robert Axelrod has already illustrated that the
payoff structure affects the level of cooperation in a game and that the greater the conflict
of interest between the players, the greater the likelihood that the players would choose to
defect.　Determining and understanding the payoff structure in a game is key, for it
determines the latitude of cooperation in that game. In Oye's words, 'when is cooperation,
defined in terms of conscious policy coordination, necessary to the realization of mutual
benefits?"　Players in any game must prefer mutual cooperation (CC) to mutual defection
(DD) for mutual benefit to exist. The need for coordination arises when players prefer
unilateral defection (DC) to unrequited cooperation (CD) and this sequence is the same for the
32) Ibid., p, 128.
33) Stephen Van Evera, "Why Cooperation Failed in 1914, in Kenneth A. Oye eds. Cooperation Under A花αrchy.
34) Ibid., p. 109.
35) Oye, Cooperatわn Under Anarchy, p. 12; and Axelrod, The Evolution of Cooperatbn, chap. 3 and 4.
36) See Robert Axelrod, "Conflict of Interests: An Axiomatic Approach, Jour,柁αI of Conflict Resolution, Vol. ll
(March 1967), pp. 87-99.
37) Oye, Cooperation Under Arはrchy, p. 6.
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familiar games of prisoner's dilemma, stag hunt, and chicken.31
However, there are many international situations that do not fall within this class of
games. First of all, there are cases in which cooperation is not necessary at all. In game-
theoretic terms, when there is an existing realization of mutual interests, or if actors prefer
unrequited cooperation (CD) to unilateral defection (DC) from the beginning, there exists no
reason to cheat - a situation called harmony.39' secondly, there are international situations
where there are undeniable absences of mutual interests, often referred to as deadlock. If at
least one actor prefers always defecting (DD) to always cooperating (CC), conflict is inevitable
and discussion over cooperation becomes meaningless.
Altering the payoff structure changes the fundamental nature of the game, transforming
the conflict into a new type of game. For example, in a prisoner's dilemma, the initial
incentive is to defect regardless of what the other player does, and the dilemma is that if
both defect, both will do worse than if both had cooperated. If the initial preferences of the
players shift from mutual defection to mutual cooperation, the game begins to resemble the
characteristics of a lesser conflicting game, such as a stag hunt.4" A different shift in
preferences can also make the game more conflicting than a prisoner's dilemma.
Due to the fact that payoff structures are affected by forces beyond the players'control
(such as changes in the surrounding environment) the easiest way to change the payoff
structure is by unilaterally altering the nature of the game. Oye notes that　-unilateral
strategies can improve the prospects of cooperation by reducing the costs of being exploited
(CD) and the gains groom exploitation (DC).'' For example, according to Jervis, this can be
achieved when a hegemonic power favors procurement of defensive over offensive weapons.
By doing so, the hegemonic power can reduce its own costs from exploitation through
surprise attack (DC) and reduce its adversary's fear of exploitation (CD). Multilateral
strategies such as the formation of international regimes can also shift the preference
sequences. International regimes can, for example, create new norms which can be
circumscribed by states. New information resulting from certain regimes can also change-''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''I''''T
38) Other games and their preferences in international politics are: (1) stag hunt, CC>DC>DD>CD; (2) chicken,
DC>CC>CD>DD; (3) deadlock, absence of mutual interest; and (4) harmony, the absence of gains from defection.
Ibid.,pp.7-9.
39) Such a situation, where there exists no incentive to cheat, is called harmony. For a detailed description of
cooperation and harmony, see Keohane, After Hegemony, pp. 51-55.
40) Robert Jervis explains this shift in preference with a balance-of-power system and concert system. According to
Jervis, after a war against a hegemonic power, the other great powers often perceive a mutual interest in
continuing to work together to ensure that the defeated hegemony does not rise again, thereby displaying
characteristics of a stag hunt.
41) Oye, Cooperation Under Anarchy, p. 10.
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states'interests.*
Thomas Schellmg points out that in real world cases, governments step in to change the
effective payoffs. Simply stated, one who breaks the law will be caught and sentenced.
What governments and laws do is to make def∝tion less attractive a choice. In international
relations, this advice implicates that there is an international regime, which is able to force
its will on to nations. In addition, major changes in the payoff structure can transform the
fundamental structure of the game, so that it is no long a prisoner-s dilemma.
However, according to Axelrod, even a minor change in the payoff structure can make
cooperation based on reciprocity stable.　What is needed is for the long-term incentive for
mutual cooperation to be greater than the short-term incentive for defection. According to
Axelrod∴if the punishment for defection is. so great that cooperation is the best choice in the
short run, no matter what the other player does, then there is no longer a dilemma."4
Furthermore, even a slight alteration of the payoffs help make cooperation based on
reciprocity more stable, even when the game is still a prisoner's dilemma. Basically, making
the long-term incentive for mutual cooperation greater than the short-term incentive for
defection is enough of a change to make cooperation stable. A game with a future offers
players an incentive-higher payoffs m the long run for mutual cooperation than mutual
defection, as well as means to sanction a previous defection.41
4. Strategies of Reciprocity
A strategy is a direct or indirect course of action, consisting of a series of maneuvers, to
reach an objective at a cost that is significantly less than the benefits to be gained. It is
defined by judgments about what to do, how to do it, and how to limit both the costs and
adverse consequences of doing it. In any given game, the number of possible moves and the
number of choices for each move remains infinite. Although players do not know how the
game will turn out, once each player has chosen a strategy among all the possible strategies
available, the course of the game is completely determined.4　Therefore a strategy is the
simplification of more complex decision making processes.4'
42) See Ernst B. Haas, "Words Can Hurt You; Or Who Said What to Whom About Regimes, in Stephen D. Krasner,
s., In加αtional Regimes (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1983).
43) Axelrod, The Evolution of Cooperation, p. 134.
44) Ibid.
45) Ibid., p. 15.
46) Rapoport, Two-Person Game Theory, p. 45.
47) According to Duncan Snidal, "a strategy is a complete plan of action, covering all contingencies including random
exogenous events as well as endogenous behavior by others." See Snidal, "Game Theory of International
Relations, 'p. 37.
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In the prisoner' dilemma, as in all symmetric games, the strategy that works best depends
directly on what strategy the other player is using, and in particular, on whether this
strategy leaves room for the development of mutual cooperation.48' Furthermore, this
principle is based on the importance of the next move relative to the current move, making
the future important. In general, a strategy is specification of what to do in any situation
that might arise, with the situation depending upon the history of the game so far.49' First
of all, the effectiveness of a strategy depends on the strategy employed by the other
participant (for symmetric games). Secondly, "an effective strategy must be able at any point
to take into account the history of the interaction as it has developed so far."50' These two
points illustrate that an effective strategy in an iterated prisoner-s dilemma is contingent
upon the strategy of the other player.
Axelrod conducted a computer tournament for the study of effective choice iterated
prisoner's dilemma.51' This was because according to Axelrod, there was a need to illustrate
how to play the game well" and a new approach was needed that drew -'on people who have
a rich understanding of the strategic possibilities inherent in a non-zero sum setting, a
situation in which the interests of the participants partially coincide and partially
conflict."　Out of the fourteen strategies submitted, tit-for-tat submitted by Anatol Rapport
won the tournament.
As a strategy, tit-for-tat is dependent on four conditions: (1) unless provoked, the player
will always cooperate; (2) if provoked, the player will retaliate; (3) the player is quick to
forgive; and (4) the play must be iterated. Although not explicitly mentioned the four
conditions naturally indicate that if a player knows that the next play will be the last, it
should (will) defect for a higher score. Tit-for-tat starts with a cooperative choice, and
thereafter the player does what the other player did on the previous move. This simple,
conditional cooperative strategy is probably the most famous strategy for playing the
prisoners dilemma. According to Axelrod, tit-for-tat is successful because it "is nice,
forgiving, and retaliatory. It is never the first to defect; it forgives an isolated defection
after a single response, but it is always incited by a defection no matter how good the
interaction had been so far.'-53)
No other strategy can defeat tit-for-tat if the shadow of the future is large. This is
48) Asymmetric games, such as the ultimatum game and dictator game, have different strategies for each player
49) Axelrod, The Evolution of Cooperation, p. 14.
50) Ibid., p. 30.
51) Ibid., pp.31-54.
52) Ibid., pp. 29-30.
53) Ibid., p. 46.
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Axelrods second proposition on strategy. The shadow of the future is the critical variable
for the success and effectiveness of tit-for-tat as a strategy. As Axelrod notes, "any member
of Congress who is perceived as likely to be defeated in the next election may have some
difficulty doing legislative business with colleagues on the usual basis of trust and good
credit."　The same point can also be illustrated with the "live-and-let-live system" of World
War I. Although the troops attacked each other when ordered to do so, provided that other
side would reciprocate, the troops avoided inflicting harm to one another.
Tit-for-tat reはlved much attention as it scored the highest m Axelrod's tournament. Even
second and third place contenders, Joss, Shubik, and Friedman, are close variations on tit-
for-tats simple logic. Both Friedman and Shubik rely on tit-for-tat's simple reciprocity rule
but incorporate stronger punishment threats in the event of defection. Although tiLfor-tat
is often referred to as a "nice strategy,''it is prominent to note that it is generally a type
of trigger strategy. In playing iterated games, the strategy of grim trigge'r is commonly
considered the most strictly un forgiving strategy. When using grim trigger, a player will
cooperate, but as soon as the opponent defects, the player using grim trigger will defect for
the remainder of the iterated game. In this sense, tit-for-tat is able to be provoked, but is
also forgiving because it will return to cooperation as soon as the other player starts
cooperating, therefore it incorporates the most simple and identifiable punishment threat.
Another well-known strategy based on reciprocity is the graduated reciprocation in tension
reduction, known simply as GRIT developed by Charles Osgood. Understanding GRIT can be
important for this study for it was developed as a process to illustrate how the United States
and the Soviet Union could reverse the Cold War spiral of increasing tension by embarking
upon conciliatory policies.　And therefore, unlike tit-for-tat, GRIT aimed to address a
pragmatic situation in international politics. The basic assumption of GRIT is that since the
fears of the two superpowers was based on a false premise, conciliatory policies would be able
to reduce the suspicion and tension which marred their relationship. Reconciliatory policies
are pursued through the implementation of unilateral initiatives that depend on reciprocation
for success. The success of GRIT depends essentially on a number of explicit, unilateral steps
that indicate a willingness to reduce tension. Even if such actions are not reciprocated
immediately, the initiator will continue to take conciliatory steps in other areas of the
relationship and explicitly encourage the other state to respond in kind.
Amitai Etzioni further advanced GRIT into a 'gradualist'approach to reducing tension,
54) Ibid., p. 60.
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suggesting a three-stage approach to achieving GRIT. According to Etzinoi, the first stage
involves the initiator embarking upon unilateral 'psychological'measures that will help open
communications between the two states∴'to calm jittery nerves and tone down the inter-bloc
argument so that the sides can again hear what they are saying to each other.'　With the
success of this stage, the parties can proceed to the subsequent stage. In the second stage,
similar unilateral initiatives are taken, but unlike the more symbolic ones of the first stage
these will be comparatively important political and military concessions'which require some
form of reciprocation."56' Notice that reciprocity is not required until this second stage.
Furthermore, the quality and quantity of reciprocity required in this stage is described to be
minimal. The final stage, contingent upon the success of the previous stage, will occur when
[sjuspicion and fear [have been] reduced to a level where fruitful negotiations are
possible.'-　　Threat reducing measures need to be conducted in a negotiated format, because
unilateral initiatives involve only small concessions in case defection occurs.
When the two strategies were tested for efficiency by deploying events data, tit-for-tat was
less effective than GRIT.58' In U.S-Soviet relations, the test illustrated that a single shot of
cooperation does m fact elicit some reciprocal action, but the response quickly dies out.
Strategies with repeated initiatives such as GRIT have greater effect because they allow for
a more extensive use of cooperative initiatives and create a greater buildup of cooperative
responses.　Although studies on GRIT advance the argument on the effectiveness of
strategies of reciprocity, unlike tit-for-tat, protection against defection and exploitation are
limited, relying solely on the goodwill of the other party. In addition to this, because GRIT
does not explain how the time horizon affects the strategy, the build up of cooperative
initiatives can be in vain once iteration ends. Although GRIT demonstrates how strategies
of reciprocity may apply to real situations in international politics, without the assurance of
the future, it is difficult to imagine that two enemies will be willing to engage in a reciprocal
relationship. In addition to this, a strategy such as GRIT can have the effect of spoiling the
opponent, leaving the burden on one player and the rest of the community to reform the
spoiled player.
55) Etzioni, Hard Way to Peace, p. 14.
56) Ibid., p. 99.
57) Ibid., p. 102.
58) By incorporating sets of data, COPDAB (Conflict and Peace I〕ata Bank), WEIS (World Events Interaction
Survey), allocates behavioral patterns into monthly ups and downs of shifts in levels of cooperation as one nation
takes stock of another's recent actions and how it adjusts its own behavior in response. See Joshua S. Goldstein
and John R. Freeman, Three-Way Street: Strategic Reciprocity in World Politics (Chicago: Chicago University
Press, 1990).
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The study has described how attaining cooperation is addressed by different theoretical
schools of international relations. Among them, we have examined neoliberal notions on
cooperation, with an emphasis on the possibility of mutual gains through compromises and
arrangements suggesting an optimistic picture of cooperation, and examined Axelrod's use of
the game analogy to assess the evolution of cooperatbn. Axelrods evolutionary approach to
cooperation was based on three fundamental predispositions: (1) cooperation can get started
even in a world of unconditional defection, given that interaction is iterated and cooperation
is based on reciprocity; (2) strategy based on reciprocity can thrive in a world where many
different kinds of strategies are being tried; and (3) cooperation, once established on the basis
of reciprocity can protect itself from invasion by less cooperative strategies. His analyses on
the propositions were based on a reciprocal strategy of tit-for-tat and illustrated the
dynamics of reciprocity in a mixed-interest game. On reciprocity, Axelrod offers two pieces
of advice; (1) teach people to care about each other; and (2) teach reciprocity.  In order to
broaden further understanding of cooperation m international relations, it will be necessary
to study the denotations on these two advices.
59) For Axelrod's advice on promoting and sustaining cooperation, see Axelrod, The Evolutbn of Cooperation, pp.
126-141.
